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- Autorius: Joseph Nevo
- Leidėjas: Sussex Academic Press
- ISBN-10: 1845191471
- ISBN-13: 9781845191474
- Formatas: 15.2 x 22.9 x 1.4 cm, kieti viršeliai
- Kalba: Anglų
King Hussein and Jordan's Perception of a Political Settlement with Israel, 1967-1988 (el. knyga) (skaityta knyga) | knygos.lt
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Aprašymas
Throughout the decade that predated the 1967 war, Jordan's declared views regarding Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict were not basically different from those of the Arab consensus. Namely, rejection of Israel's legitimacy. In the wake of the war King Hussein was the first Arab leader to realize that in order to regain the recently lost territories, which he considered a most vital and urgent task, he (and the other heads of state) would have to offer Israel a meaningful quid pro quo. Hence the shift in Jordans policy was twofold: (1) A change of the traditional statements that had been made by the King and his officials prior to June 1967; and (2) a change in the views expressed by Jordanian spokespersonsvis--vis;the declarations of other Arab leaders. This book follows the evolution of Jordan's new perception through textual analysis of the public statements made by Jordan's leaders between 1967 and 1988. Jordan's demands from Israel and what its leader were willing to give in return are analysed, and the constant and changing components in Jordanian viewpoints identified. The major conclusion is that even though Jordan failed to obtain its declared goals, the contribution of King Hussein to the transformation of the conflict from military antagonism to seeking a politically-oriented solution, was invaluable.
- Autorius: Joseph Nevo
- Leidėjas: Sussex Academic Press
- ISBN-10: 1845191471
- ISBN-13: 9781845191474
- Formatas: 15.2 x 22.9 x 1.4 cm, kieti viršeliai
- Kalba: Anglų
Throughout the decade that predated the 1967 war, Jordan's declared views regarding Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict were not basically different from those of the Arab consensus. Namely, rejection of Israel's legitimacy. In the wake of the war King Hussein was the first Arab leader to realize that in order to regain the recently lost territories, which he considered a most vital and urgent task, he (and the other heads of state) would have to offer Israel a meaningful quid pro quo. Hence the shift in Jordans policy was twofold: (1) A change of the traditional statements that had been made by the King and his officials prior to June 1967; and (2) a change in the views expressed by Jordanian spokespersonsvis--vis;the declarations of other Arab leaders. This book follows the evolution of Jordan's new perception through textual analysis of the public statements made by Jordan's leaders between 1967 and 1988. Jordan's demands from Israel and what its leader were willing to give in return are analysed, and the constant and changing components in Jordanian viewpoints identified. The major conclusion is that even though Jordan failed to obtain its declared goals, the contribution of King Hussein to the transformation of the conflict from military antagonism to seeking a politically-oriented solution, was invaluable.
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