Knygos.lt nariams
Knygos.lt nariams
- Išsiųsime per 12–18 d.d.
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- Autorius: Jan S Breemer
- Leidėjas: www.MilitaryBookshop.co.uk
- ISBN-10: 1780396651
- ISBN-13: 9781780396651
- Formatas: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.5 cm, minkšti viršeliai
- Kalba: Anglų
Atsiliepimai
Aprašymas
From the foreword. "In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan S. Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His account of Germany's "asymmetric" challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Britain's naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy in particular. The Royal Navy's obstinate refusal to consider seriously the option of convoying merchant vessels, which turned out to be the key to the solution of the Uboat problem, demonstrates the extent to which professional military cultures can thwart technical and operational innovation even in circumstances of existential threat. Although historical controversy continues to cloud this issue, Breemer concludes that the convoying option was embraced by the Royal Navy only under the pressure of civilian authority. Breemer ends his lively and informative study with some general reflections on military innovation and the requirements for fostering it."
- Autorius: Jan S Breemer
- Leidėjas: www.MilitaryBookshop.co.uk
- ISBN-10: 1780396651
- ISBN-13: 9781780396651
- Formatas: 18.9 x 24.6 x 0.5 cm, minkšti viršeliai
- Kalba: Anglų
From the foreword. "In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan S. Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His account of Germany's "asymmetric" challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Britain's naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy in particular. The Royal Navy's obstinate refusal to consider seriously the option of convoying merchant vessels, which turned out to be the key to the solution of the Uboat problem, demonstrates the extent to which professional military cultures can thwart technical and operational innovation even in circumstances of existential threat. Although historical controversy continues to cloud this issue, Breemer concludes that the convoying option was embraced by the Royal Navy only under the pressure of civilian authority. Breemer ends his lively and informative study with some general reflections on military innovation and the requirements for fostering it."
Atsiliepimai