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Why talented, Western-educated professionals sign up to serve the world's dictators
The popular image of a dictator surrounded by sycophantic and incompetent cronies is increasingly out of date. In fact, one out of four cabinet ministers across all authoritarian regimes holds a graduate degree from a Western university--highly credentialed technocrats willing to use their expertise to help dictators govern. In Autocratic Intelligence, David Szakonyi draws on an analysis of 103 autocracies and an in-depth study of Russia under Putin to examine why dictators recruit technocrats and entrust them with meaningful authority. Autocrats' reliance on technocrats carries some risk. Capable, Western-educated individuals may be wary of joining corrupt and violent regimes and may prove difficult to control once in place. Szakonyi shows how dictators have solved this problem: lavish material rewards, minders from the security services, and a general rule that technocrats are kept away from the guns. The risks are worth it. With technocrats in power, a regime's chances of collapse fall by roughly half. In Russia, for example, technocrats have helped rescue the regime from the shocks of crushing sanctions and a disastrous war. And when regimes fall, technocrats rarely are held accountable for their complicity. Szakonyi's account offers an entirely new way to understand authoritarian resilience--and why Western efforts to isolate these regimes so often fail.
Why talented, Western-educated professionals sign up to serve the world's dictators
The popular image of a dictator surrounded by sycophantic and incompetent cronies is increasingly out of date. In fact, one out of four cabinet ministers across all authoritarian regimes holds a graduate degree from a Western university--highly credentialed technocrats willing to use their expertise to help dictators govern. In Autocratic Intelligence, David Szakonyi draws on an analysis of 103 autocracies and an in-depth study of Russia under Putin to examine why dictators recruit technocrats and entrust them with meaningful authority. Autocrats' reliance on technocrats carries some risk. Capable, Western-educated individuals may be wary of joining corrupt and violent regimes and may prove difficult to control once in place. Szakonyi shows how dictators have solved this problem: lavish material rewards, minders from the security services, and a general rule that technocrats are kept away from the guns. The risks are worth it. With technocrats in power, a regime's chances of collapse fall by roughly half. In Russia, for example, technocrats have helped rescue the regime from the shocks of crushing sanctions and a disastrous war. And when regimes fall, technocrats rarely are held accountable for their complicity. Szakonyi's account offers an entirely new way to understand authoritarian resilience--and why Western efforts to isolate these regimes so often fail.
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