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- Autorius: Moshe Shemesh
- Leidėjas: Liverpool University Press
- ISBN-10: 1845191889
- ISBN-13: 9781845191887
- Formatas: 17.3 x 24.6 x 2.5 cm, kieti viršeliai
- Kalba: Anglų
Arab Politics Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War (el. knyga) (skaityta knyga) | knygos.lt
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Aprašymas
The Six Day War was the climax in the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The downturn began in 1957 when Nasir began preaching the idea of Arab nationalism, while placing the Palestinian problem at its centre. The decade between the Sinai War and Six Day War was marked by preparations by both sides for an all-out military confrontation which both sides viewed as inevitable. As the Arab states formulated their positions on the conflict's goals and the ways of attaining them, differences of opinion erupted between Egypt and Syria. Nasir wanted to decide the time and place for the war that would 'liberate Filastin'. He was determined to meet Israel on the battlefield only when he was certain that the outcome would mean a decisive Arab victory. He consciously and strategically led Egypt to war, carefully weighing the implications of each political/military step. This study, based almost exclusively on hitherto unavailable Arab primary sources, sets out the crystallisation of
Arab strategy to re
- Autorius: Moshe Shemesh
- Leidėjas: Liverpool University Press
- ISBN-10: 1845191889
- ISBN-13: 9781845191887
- Formatas: 17.3 x 24.6 x 2.5 cm, kieti viršeliai
- Kalba: Anglų
The Six Day War was the climax in the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The downturn began in 1957 when Nasir began preaching the idea of Arab nationalism, while placing the Palestinian problem at its centre. The decade between the Sinai War and Six Day War was marked by preparations by both sides for an all-out military confrontation which both sides viewed as inevitable. As the Arab states formulated their positions on the conflict's goals and the ways of attaining them, differences of opinion erupted between Egypt and Syria. Nasir wanted to decide the time and place for the war that would 'liberate Filastin'. He was determined to meet Israel on the battlefield only when he was certain that the outcome would mean a decisive Arab victory. He consciously and strategically led Egypt to war, carefully weighing the implications of each political/military step. This study, based almost exclusively on hitherto unavailable Arab primary sources, sets out the crystallisation of
Arab strategy to re
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