Atsiliepimai
Aprašymas
The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was one of the most important engagements since World War II. The battle's result capped years of conflict, forced French decolonization in Southeast Asia, and rippled across the world. It also led directly to the partition of Indochina into Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Vietnam, thus setting the stage for two more decades of war ending with Saigon's fall in 1975. In many ways, Dien Bien Phu is one of the pivotal moments in Southeast Asia's modern history.
The key personality in this campaign was General Henri Navarre, who commanded French forces in Indochina from May 1953 to June 1954. An experienced officer of long service, Navarre published his memoirs in France in 1956 under the title Agonie de l'Indochine (Agony of Indochina). It is far-ranging book, covering all aspects of his time in supreme command. Several chapters analyze his strategy and thinking, alongside the political and economic factors that influenced him. He also gives a detailed overview of the war before his appointment, and explores the underappreciated but significant influence of U.S. officers and aid on French operations. The heart of the book is his discussion of Dien Bien Phu and concurrent operations, which offer important insights never previously published in English. An editor's introduction describes General Navarre's background and provides some context for the book. Updated maps and illustrations accompany the text.
The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was one of the most important engagements since World War II. The battle's result capped years of conflict, forced French decolonization in Southeast Asia, and rippled across the world. It also led directly to the partition of Indochina into Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Vietnam, thus setting the stage for two more decades of war ending with Saigon's fall in 1975. In many ways, Dien Bien Phu is one of the pivotal moments in Southeast Asia's modern history.
The key personality in this campaign was General Henri Navarre, who commanded French forces in Indochina from May 1953 to June 1954. An experienced officer of long service, Navarre published his memoirs in France in 1956 under the title Agonie de l'Indochine (Agony of Indochina). It is far-ranging book, covering all aspects of his time in supreme command. Several chapters analyze his strategy and thinking, alongside the political and economic factors that influenced him. He also gives a detailed overview of the war before his appointment, and explores the underappreciated but significant influence of U.S. officers and aid on French operations. The heart of the book is his discussion of Dien Bien Phu and concurrent operations, which offer important insights never previously published in English. An editor's introduction describes General Navarre's background and provides some context for the book. Updated maps and illustrations accompany the text.
Atsiliepimai